EXECUTIVE EFFORT AND SELECTION OF RISKY PROJECTS

[1] CAPITAL RATIONING AND ORGANIZATIONAL SLACK IN CAPITAL-BUDGETING [J]. MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 1985, 31 (02) : 163 - 174

[2] DEMSKI J, 1985, DELEGATED EXPERTISE

[3] AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1983, 51 (01) : 7 - 45

[4] OPTIMAL INCENTIVE CONTRACTS WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1979, 20 (02) : 231 - 259

[5] HARRIS M, 1978, AM ECON REV, V68, P20

[6] MORAL HAZARD AND OBSERVABILITY [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1979, 10 (01): : 74 - 91

[7] HOLMSTROM B, 1984, MANAGERIAL INCENTIVE

[8] Kaplan R., 1982, ADV MANAGEMENT ACCOU

[9] RAPPAPORT A, 1978, HARVARD BUSINESS REV, V57, P81

[1] CAPITAL RATIONING AND ORGANIZATIONAL SLACK IN CAPITAL-BUDGETING [J]. MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 1985, 31 (02) : 163 - 174

[2] DEMSKI J, 1985, DELEGATED EXPERTISE

[3] AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1983, 51 (01) : 7 - 45

[4] OPTIMAL INCENTIVE CONTRACTS WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1979, 20 (02) : 231 - 259

[5] HARRIS M, 1978, AM ECON REV, V68, P20

[6] MORAL HAZARD AND OBSERVABILITY [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1979, 10 (01): : 74 - 91

[7] HOLMSTROM B, 1984, MANAGERIAL INCENTIVE

[8] Kaplan R., 1982, ADV MANAGEMENT ACCOU

[9] RAPPAPORT A, 1978, HARVARD BUSINESS REV, V57, P81