Board Monitoring and Earnings Management Pre- and Post-IFRS

被引:101
作者
Marra, Antonio [1 ]
Mazzola, Pietro [2 ]
Prencipe, Annalisa [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ L Bocconi, Dept Accounting, Milan, Italy
[2] Univ Bocconi, Univ IULM, CAFRA, Milan, Italy
来源
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING | 2011年 / 46卷 / 02期
关键词
Board independence; Audit committee; Earnings management; IFRS;
D O I
10.1016/j.intacc.2011.04.007
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
In this paper, we address the question of whether the board of directors is more effective in constraining earnings management after the mandatory application of IFRS. Specifically, we explore how two board characteristics - board independence and (2) the existence of an audit committee impact earnings management. Our empirical results suggest that board independence and audit committees play an important and effective role in reducing earnings management after the introduction of IFRS and that the accounting regulatory framework significantly contributes to the effectiveness of the two corporate governance mechanisms. Our findings also confirm that a company's corporate governance characteristics remain an important determinant of earnings quality; therefore, an analysis of the effects of new regulations must consider firm-level determinants. (C) 2011 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:205 / 230
页数:26
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