EFFICIENT CREDIT RATIONING

被引：24

作者：

DEMEZA, D

WEBB, DC

机构：

[1] UNIV LONDON LONDON SCH ECON & POLIT SCI,HOUGHTON ST,LONDON WC2A 2AE,ENGLAND

[2] UNIV EXETER,EXETER EX4 4RJ,DEVON,ENGLAND

来源：

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 1992年 / 36卷 / 06期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0014-2921(92)90032-R

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper shows that credit rationing is endemic to competitive capital markets in which information is symmetrically distributed. Equilibrium contracts may restrict loans to a size well below that at which bankruptcy is a threat. The model predicts that credit rationing will be most severe on projects of intermediate risk and decreases the more costly it is for creditors to recover bad debts. However, there is no case for government intervention, despite the usual identification of credit rationing as a per se capital market imperfection.

引用

页码：1277 / 1290

页数：14

共 9 条

[1]

ANDO F, 1985, ACCESS CAPITAL SUBCA

[2]

FREIMER M, 1962, Q J ECON, V79, P387

[3] IMPERFECT INFORMATION, UNCERTAINTY, AND CREDIT RATIONING [J].