MULTI-PERIOD CONTRACTS BETWEEN PRINCIPAL AND AGENT WITH ADVERSE SELECTION

被引：38

作者：

BESANKO, D

机构：

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0165-1765(85)90122-3

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：33 / 37

页数：5

共 6 条

[1] REGULATING A MONOPOLIST WITH UNKNOWN COSTS [J].

BARON, DP ;

MYERSON, RB .

[2] OPTIMAL INCENTIVE CONTRACTS WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION [J].

HARRIS, M ;

RAVIV, A .

[3]

MATTHEWS S, 1983, J EC THEORY, V29

[4]

ROBERTS K, 1982, LONG TERM CONTRACTS

[5] LIMITED-LIABILITY CONTRACTS BETWEEN PRINCIPAL AND AGENT [J].

SAPPINGTON, D .

TOWNSEND, RM .