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OPTIMAL COALITION SIZE WHEN MAKING PROPOSALS IS COSTLY
被引:8
作者
:
GLAZER, A
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
US SECUR & EXCHANGE COMMISS,OFF EC ANAL,WASHINGTON,DC 20549
US SECUR & EXCHANGE COMMISS,OFF EC ANAL,WASHINGTON,DC 20549
GLAZER, A
[
1
]
MCMILLAN, H
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
US SECUR & EXCHANGE COMMISS,OFF EC ANAL,WASHINGTON,DC 20549
US SECUR & EXCHANGE COMMISS,OFF EC ANAL,WASHINGTON,DC 20549
MCMILLAN, H
[
1
]
机构
:
[1]
US SECUR & EXCHANGE COMMISS,OFF EC ANAL,WASHINGTON,DC 20549
来源
:
SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE
|
1990年
/ 7卷
/ 04期
关键词
:
D O I
:
10.1007/BF01376284
中图分类号
:
F [经济];
学科分类号
:
02 ;
摘要
:
Though some costs of proposing legislation are borne by individual congressmen, the benefits accrue to many. To encourage legislators to incur these costs, members may wish to form coalitions which are larger than a minimum majority, and they may want to allow the proposer of a policy to incorporate private benefits into his proposal. © 1990 Springer-Verlag.
引用
收藏
页码:369 / 380
页数:12
相关论文
共 33 条
[21]
Kingdon J., 2003, AGENDAS ALTERNATIVES, V2nd
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CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OVERLOOKED - POLICE PATROLS VERSUS FIRE ALARMS
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AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,
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23
(02)
:245
-262
←
1
2
3
4
→
共 33 条
[21]
Kingdon J., 2003, AGENDAS ALTERNATIVES, V2nd
[22]
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OVERLOOKED - POLICE PATROLS VERSUS FIRE ALARMS
[J].
MCCUBBINS, MD
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
MCCUBBINS, MD
;
SCHWARTZ, T
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
SCHWARTZ, T
.
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,
1984,
28
(01)
:165
-179
[23]
VOTING BY VETO
[J].
MUELLER, DC
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
UNIV MARYLAND,COLLEGE PK,MD 20742
UNIV MARYLAND,COLLEGE PK,MD 20742
MUELLER, DC
.
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS,
1978,
10
(01)
:57
-75
[24]
A STRATEGIC CALCULUS OF VOTING
[J].
PALFREY, TR
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
PALFREY, TR
;
ROSENTHAL, H
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
ROSENTHAL, H
.
PUBLIC CHOICE,
1983,
41
(01)
:7
-53
[25]
PARTICIPATION AND THE PROVISION OF DISCRETE PUBLIC-GOODS - A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS
[J].
PALFREY, TR
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
PALFREY, TR
;
ROSENTHAL, H
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
ROSENTHAL, H
.
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS,
1984,
24
(02)
:171
-193
[26]
ALLOCATION OF EFFORT
[J].
RADNER, R
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
UNIV CALIF,DEPT ECON & STATISTICS,BERKELEY,CA 94720
RADNER, R
;
ROTHSCHILD, M
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
UNIV CALIF,DEPT ECON & STATISTICS,BERKELEY,CA 94720
ROTHSCHILD, M
.
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY,
1975,
10
(03)
:358
-376
[27]
BUREAUCRATS VERSUS VOTERS - POLITICAL-ECONOMY OF RESOURCE-ALLOCATION BY DIRECT DEMOCRACY
[J].
ROMER, T
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
HOOVER INST,WASHINGTON,DC
ROMER, T
;
ROSENTHAL, H
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
HOOVER INST,WASHINGTON,DC
ROSENTHAL, H
.
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS,
1979,
93
(04)
:563
-587
[28]
POLITICAL PREFERENCES FOR THE PORK BARREL - A GENERALIZATION
[J].
SHEPSLE, KA
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
SHEPSLE, KA
;
WEINGAST, BR
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
WEINGAST, BR
.
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,
1981,
25
(01)
:96
-111
[29]
CONSISTENT CONJECTURES AND VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO PUBLIC-GOODS - WHY THE CONVENTIONAL THEORY DOES NOT WORK
[J].
SUGDEN, R
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
SUGDEN, R
.
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS,
1985,
27
(01)
:117
-124
[30]
RATIONAL CHOICE PERSPECTIVE ON CONGRESSIONAL NORMS
[J].
WEINGAST, BR
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
WEINGAST, BR
.
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,
1979,
23
(02)
:245
-262
←
1
2
3
4
→