REEXAMINING EFFICIENT RENT-SEEKING IN LABORATORY MARKETS

被引：39

作者：

SHOGREN, JF ^{[1
]}

BAIK, KH ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] APPALACHIAN STATE UNIV,DEPT ECON,BOONE,NC 28608

来源：

PUBLIC CHOICE | 1991年 / 69卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1007/BF00123855

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Given Millner and Pratt's (1989) finding of behavior inconsistent with theory, we reexamine efficient rent-seeking in experimental markets. We show that (a) when r = 3, no Nash equilibrium exists and therefore behavior has no theoretical benchmark to judge consistency, and (b) when r = 1, with a new experimental design utilizing an explicit expected payoff matrix, rent-seeking behavior is consistent with both Nash equilibrium and dissipation hypotheses. © 1991 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

引用

页码：69 / 79

页数：11

共 7 条

[1] TOURNAMENTS AND PIECE RATES - AN EXPERIMENTAL-STUDY [J].