AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF EFFICIENT RENT-SEEKING

被引：75

作者：

MILLNER, EL

PRATT, MD

机构：

来源：

PUBLIC CHOICE | 1989年 / 62卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1007/BF00124330

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：139 / 151

页数：13

共 11 条

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SHUGHART, WF ;

TOLLISON, RD .

PUBLIC CHOICE, 1985, 46 (03) :247-258

[5] RISK-AVERSE RENT SEEKERS AND THE SOCIAL COST OF MONOPOLY POWER [J].

HILLMAN, AL ;

KATZ, E .

ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 1984, 94 (373) :104-110

[6]

MILLNER EL, 1988, 4 VIRG COMM U LAB EX

[7]

POSNER RA, 1975, J POLITICAL EC, V83, P348

[8] THE SOCIAL COSTS OF MONOPOLY AND REGULATION - A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS [J].

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[9] EFFICIENT RENTS .3. BACK TO THE BOG [J].

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PUBLIC CHOICE, 1985, 46 (03) :259-263

[10]

TULLOCK G, 1967, WESTERN ECON J, V5, P224

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