THE FIRM AS AN INCENTIVE SYSTEM

被引:111
作者
HOLMSTROM, B [1 ]
MILGROM, P [1 ]
机构
[1] STANFORD UNIV,DEPT ECON,STANFORD,CA 94305
关键词
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We explore the twin hypotheses (i) that high-performance incentives, worker ownership of assets, and worker freedom from direct controls are complementary instruments for motivating workers, and (ii) that such instruments can be expected to covary positively in cross-sectional data. We also relate our conclusions to empirical evidence, particularly that on the organization, compensation, and management of sales forces.
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页码:972 / 991
页数:20
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