AN EXTENSION OF THE SORENSEN-KALLEBERG THEORY OF THE LABOR-MARKET MATCHING AND ATTAINMENT PROCESSES

In this article, I advance the theory of the labor market matching and attainment processes outlined in Sorensen and Kalleberg (1981) and provide an empirical test of the new specification. I extend the Sorensen-Kalleberg theory by elaborating (1) the role of the individual actions of employers and workers and (2) the relationship among resources held by employers and workers, resources desired by employers and workers, and the structure of control in the labor market. Consequences of these relations for reward attainment are discussed, and a model is derived for the matching and attainment processes. Data from the 1991 General Social Survey Work Organization Module are used to test these hypotheses. Consistent with the theory, the results show that in a closed system, the matching process accounts for over 50 percent of the variance in wage attainment for men and for women. Results also suggest that men benefit more than do women from closed systems originating solely from either job ladders or from skill. Closed systems originating from both job ladders and skill benefit men and women equally.