THE ECONOMY OF HIGH WAGES - AN AGENCY PROBLEM

被引：29

作者：

EATON, C ^{[1
]}

WHITE, WD ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV ILLINOIS,URBANA,IL 61801

来源：

ECONOMICA | 1983年 / 50卷 / 198期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2554059

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

收藏

页码：175 / 181

页数：7

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