COMMON AGENCY

被引：308

作者：

BERNHEIM, BD ^{[1
]}

WHINSTON, MD ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] HARVARD UNIV,DEPT ECON,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02138

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/1912844

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：923 / 942

页数：20

共 23 条

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BERNHEIM, BD
WHINSTON, MD
[J]. RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1985, 16 (02) : 269 - 281
[5] BRAVERMAN A, 1982, AM ECON REV, V72, P695
[6] DIAMOND PA, 1978, J PUBLIC EC, V13, P295
[7] GREEN J, 1981, 862 HARV I EC RES DI
[8] AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM
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HART, OD
[J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1983, 51 (01) : 7 - 45
[9] Hardy G. H., 1952, MATH GAZ
[10] OPTIMAL INCENTIVE CONTRACTS WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION
HARRIS, M
RAVIV, A
[J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1979, 20 (02) : 231 - 259