INTERMITTENT REINFORCEMENT AND ESCALATION PROCESSES IN SEQUENTIAL DECISION-MAKING - A REPLICATION AND THEORETICAL-ANALYSIS

The effects of an immediate history of intermittent regular and irregular reinforcement and continuous reinforcement on subsequent decisions to recommit resources to a failing course of action were investigated using a computerized investment simulation. Reinforcement histories were manipulated by providing controlled gains and losses from investment decisions. Subjects who experienced an irregular-partial schedule of returns from a stock persisted in investing in a failing stock and escalated amounts invested in the beginning of a failure period, but began to de-escalate investing near the end of the failure period. Neither subjects who experienced a regular-partial schedule of returns nor subjects who experienced a continuous schedule of returns from the stock evidenced such persistence and escalation effects during failure. Although not entirely consistent with previous case role play studies of escalation, these data are consistent with a behavioral account of escalation and persistence in sequential decision making, and underscore the importance of considering both individual history and decision sequence in analyzing decision outcomes.