THE HAYEK HYPOTHESIS IN EXPERIMENTAL AUCTIONS - INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTS AND MARKET POWER

被引：32

作者：

DAVIS, DD ^{[1
]}

WILLIAMS, AW ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] INDIANA UNIV,BLOOMINGTON,IN 47401

来源：

ECONOMIC INQUIRY | 1991年 / 29卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/j.1465-7295.1991.tb01270.x

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We report twelve market experiments utilizing a “seller market power” supply and demand structure where two of five sellers can unilaterally increase their profit by withholding supply. The data indicate that both the double auction and posted offer institutions result in traders extracting the bulk of the potential gains from exchange in the market; however, prices generally occur above the competitive equilibrium prediction. Market power in the form of strategic supply withholding does not appear to be responsible for the supra‐competitive prices. Copyright © 1991, Wiley Blackwell. All rights reserved

引用

页码：261 / 274

页数：14

共 13 条

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