FEDERAL DEFICITS, INTEREST-RATES AND MONETARY-POLICY

[71] Sidrauski M, 1967, AM ECON REV, V57, P534

[72] INFLATION-INDUCED DISTORTIONS IN GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SAVING STATISTICS [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS, 1979, 61 (01) : 83 - 90

[73] RULES, DISCRETION AND REPUTATION IN A MODEL OF MONETARY-POLICY - COMMENTS [J]. JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS, 1983, 12 (01) : 123 - 125

[74] THEORY OF SELF-ENFORCING AGREEMENTS [J]. JOURNAL OF BUSINESS, 1980, 53 (01) : 27 - 44

[75] INFLATIONARY BIAS OF THE FEDERAL-RESERVE SYSTEM - A BUREAUCRATIC PERSPECTIVE [J]. JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS, 1982, 10 (02) : 163 - 190

[76] TOMA M, 1985, J MONETARY EC

[77] TIME CONSISTENCY AND OPTIMAL GOVERNMENT POLICIES IN PERFECT FORESIGHT EQUILIBRIUM [J]. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1980, 13 (02) : 183 - 212

[78] *US DEP COMM, 1983, BUS STAT 1982

[79] *US DEP COMM, 1984, SURV CURR BUS

[80] *US EX OFF PRES, 1985, BUDG US GOVT FISC YE

[71] Sidrauski M, 1967, AM ECON REV, V57, P534

[72] INFLATION-INDUCED DISTORTIONS IN GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SAVING STATISTICS [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS, 1979, 61 (01) : 83 - 90

[73] RULES, DISCRETION AND REPUTATION IN A MODEL OF MONETARY-POLICY - COMMENTS [J]. JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS, 1983, 12 (01) : 123 - 125

[74] THEORY OF SELF-ENFORCING AGREEMENTS [J]. JOURNAL OF BUSINESS, 1980, 53 (01) : 27 - 44

[75] INFLATIONARY BIAS OF THE FEDERAL-RESERVE SYSTEM - A BUREAUCRATIC PERSPECTIVE [J]. JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS, 1982, 10 (02) : 163 - 190

[76] TOMA M, 1985, J MONETARY EC

[77] TIME CONSISTENCY AND OPTIMAL GOVERNMENT POLICIES IN PERFECT FORESIGHT EQUILIBRIUM [J]. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1980, 13 (02) : 183 - 212

[78] *US DEP COMM, 1983, BUS STAT 1982

[79] *US DEP COMM, 1984, SURV CURR BUS

[80] *US EX OFF PRES, 1985, BUDG US GOVT FISC YE