FIRM PERFORMANCE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND TOP EXECUTIVE TURNOVER IN JAPAN

被引:353
作者
KANG, JK
SHIVDASANI, A
机构
[1] MICHIGAN STATE UNIV,ELI BROAD COLL BUSINESS,E LANSING,MI 48824
[2] UNIV RHODE ISL,DEPT FINANCE & INSURANCE,KINGSTON,RI 02881
关键词
MANAGEMENT TURNOVER; JAPANESE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; MAIN BANK SYSTEM JEL CLASSIFICATION; G32; L14;
D O I
10.1016/0304-405X(94)00807-D
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We examine the role of corporate governance mechanisms during top executive turnover in Japanese corporations. Consistent with evidence from U.S. data, the likelihood of nonroutine turnover is significantly related to industry-adjusted return on assets, excess stock returns, and negative operating income, but is not related to industry performance. The sensitivity of nonroutine turnover to earnings performance is higher for firms with ties to a main bank than for firms without such ties. Outside succession in Japan is more likely for firms with large shareholders and a main bank relationship. We document performance improvements subsequent to nonroutine turnover and outside succession.
引用
收藏
页码:29 / 58
页数:30
相关论文
共 39 条
[21]  
Kester W. C, 1991, JAPANESE TAKEOVERS G
[22]  
KESTER WC, 1986, FINANCIAL MANAGE SPR, P5
[23]  
KOMIYA R, 1989, GENDAI CHUGOKU KEIZA, P97
[24]  
LICHTENBERG FR, 1992, NBER4092 WORK PAP
[25]   CORPORATE PERFORMANCE, CORPORATE TAKEOVERS, AND MANAGEMENT TURNOVER [J].
MARTIN, KJ ;
MCCONNELL, JJ .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 1991, 46 (02) :671-687
[26]   DO BAD BIDDERS BECOME GOOD TARGETS [J].
MITCHELL, ML ;
LEHN, K .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1990, 98 (02) :372-398
[27]  
MORCK R, 1989, AM ECON REV, V79, P842
[28]  
MORCK R, 1994, BANKS CORPORATE CONT
[29]  
MORCK RM, 1988, CORPORATE TAKEOVERS
[30]   FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE SURROUNDING CEO TURNOVER [J].
MURPHY, KJ ;
ZIMMERMAN, JL .
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 1993, 16 (1-3) :273-315