WHY ARE SOME PRODUCTS BRANDED AND OTHERS NOT

被引:38
作者
PNG, IPL
REITMAN, D
机构
[1] HONG KONG UNIV SCI & TECHNOL,HONG KONG,HONG KONG
[2] OHIO STATE UNIV,COLUMBUS,OH 43210
关键词
D O I
10.1086/467329
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Why do some consumers pay a premium for branded products? According to the consumer information theory, brands signal the quality of experience goods (products whose quality cannot be determined on inspection) to consumers for whom, personal search and testing is relatively costly. We find that the product and customer mix in a sample of branded and unbranded service stations is generally consistent with the theory. Branded dealers are more likely to carry products for which cheating on quality is an issue and to serve customers for whom personal search and testing is relatively costly.
引用
收藏
页码:207 / 224
页数:18
相关论文
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