THE INVESTMENT BANKING CONTRACT FOR NEW ISSUES UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION - DELEGATION AND THE INCENTIVE PROBLEM

被引：101

作者：

BARON, DP

HOLMSTROM, B

机构：

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2327089

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：1115 / 1138

页数：24

共 27 条

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