WHY MUST INFERIOR COURTS OBEY SUPERIOR COURT PRECEDENTS

The doctrine of hierarchical precedent is so deeply ingrained in judicial practice and consciousness that its dominance has rarely been questioned, and, paradoxically, its validity has never been justified. In addressing that paradox, Professor Caminker undertakes a comprehensive inquiry into the constitutional and rationalist justifications for the doctrine, outlining and assessing the various arguments supporting differing degrees of autonomy for the lower courts. He concludes that while the doctrine of hierarchical precedent is ultimately defensible, it is not as obviously defensible as the doctrine's strength would suggest. Further, no one single rationale justifies the practice for all levels of the judiciary. A persuasive account must rely on a combination of constitutional and prudential arguments. Finally, Professor Caminker argues that his account of the underpinnings of hierarchical precedent helps resolve current controversies in constitutional law and jurisprudence, including whether existing Supreme Court decisions would still bind inferior federal or state courts if Congress stripped the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over some cases, and whether bankruptcy judges must obey federal district court precedents.