BIDDING RINGS

被引：28

作者：

MCAFEE, RP ^{[1
]}

MCMILLAN, J ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV CALIF SAN DIEGO,GRAD SCH INT RELAT & PACIFIC STUDIES,LA JOLLA,CA 92093

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 1992年 / 82卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We characterize coordinated bidding strategies in two cases: a weak cartel, in which the bidders cannot make side-payments; and a strong cartel, in which the cartel members can exclude new entrants and can make transfer payments. The weak cartel can do no better than have its members submit identical bids. The strong cartel in effect reauctions the good among the cartel members.

引用

页码：579 / 599

页数：21

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