NASH EQUILIBRIUM WITH STRATEGIC COMPLEMENTARITIES

被引：487

作者：

VIVES, X

机构：

[1] Institute d'Análisi Economica, CSIC Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 08193 Bellaterra, Barcelona

来源：

JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS | 1990年 / 19卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0304-4068(90)90005-T

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Using lattice-theoretical methods, we analyze the existence and order structure of Nash equilibria of non-cooperative games where payoffs satisfy certain monotonicity properties (which are directly related to strategic complementarities) but need not be quasiconcave. In games with strategic complementarities the equilibrium set is always non-empty and has an order structure which ranges from the existence of a minimum and a maxinum element to being a complete lattice. Some stability properties of equilibria are also pointed out. © 1990.

引用

页码：305 / 321

页数：17