REPRICING EXECUTIVE STOCK-OPTIONS IN A DOWN MARKET

被引：47

作者：

SALY, PJ

机构：

[1] Carlson School of Management, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis

来源：

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS | 1994年 / 18卷 / 03期

关键词：

MANAGEMENT COMPENSATION; EXECUTIVE STOCK OPTIONS; CONTRACTING;

D O I：

10.1016/0165-4101(94)90025-6

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

This paper analyzes the repricing of employee stock options after a market-wide crash. The model identifies sufficient conditions for renegotiation to be optimal and for optimal compensation to be a fixed salary plus stock options. Empirical results support the renegotiation prediction. Stock option grants increase in both number and value after the 1987 crash. Firms with underwater options grant significantly more options post-crash than pre-crash, whereas firms with in-the-money options don't. Furthermore, firms suffering the largest impact from the crash are the most likely to increase grants after the crash.

引用

页码：325 / 356

页数：32

共 22 条

[11] CONTRACT RENEGOTIATION AND COASIAN DYNAMICS [J].