RENT-SEEKING FOR PURE PUBLIC-GOODS

被引:155
作者
KATZ, E [1 ]
NITZAN, S [1 ]
ROSENBERG, J [1 ]
机构
[1] BAR ILAN UNIV,DEPT ECON,RAMAT GAN,ISRAEL
关键词
D O I
10.1007/BF00139290
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In this paper we present a formal analysis of rent-seeking for public goods by two or more groups with different numbers of individuals. We begin by considering equally wealthy groups under risk neutrality, a case which constitutes our basic model. Several surprising and interesting results emerge from the analysis of this basic case. The problem is then extended to deal with (a) groups with different wealth levels, and (b) risk aversion. This last extension brings about a further crop of interesting and useful results. © 1990 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
引用
收藏
页码:49 / 60
页数:12
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