THE CONVENTIONALLY STABLE SETS IN NONCOOPERATIVE GAMES WITH LIMITED OBSERVATIONS .1. DEFINITIONS AND INTRODUCTORY ARGUMENTS

被引：7

作者：

KANEKO, M

机构：

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0165-4896(87)90049-7

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：93 / 128

页数：36

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