THE RATCHET EFFECT AND THE MARKET FOR SECONDHAND WORKERS

被引：44

作者：

KANEMOTO, Y ^{[1
]}

MACLEOD, WB ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV MONTREAL,MONTREAL H3C 3J7,QUEBEC,CANADA

来源：

JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS | 1992年 / 10卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1086/298279

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Workers in a long-term relationship often have an incentive to hide their ability early in the relationship to avoid having the firm increase the level of output expected from them in the future. We show that competition for older workers will permit the implementation of efficient piece-rate contracts. When the difficulty of the job is unobserved by the firm, Gibbons (1987) has shown that all piece-rate contracts will be inefficient. Together, these results may explain why piece rates are common in some jobs, such as agricultural work and sales, and not as popular for many manufacturing jobs.

引用

页码：85 / 98

页数：14

共 11 条

[1]

Baron D.P., 1984, INFORM EC POLICY, V1, P267

[2] PLANNING UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION AND THE RATCHET EFFECT [J].