IMPLEMENTATION WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION IN EXCHANGE ECONOMIES

被引：69

作者：

PALFREY, TR ^{[1
]}

SRIVASTAVA, S ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV,GRAD SCH IND ADM,PITTSBURGH,PA 15213

来源：

ECONOMETRICA | 1989年 / 57卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/1912575

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：115 / 134

页数：20

共 23 条

[1]

BLUME L, 1985, IMPLEMENTATION EXPEC

[2] DISSOLVING A PARTNERSHIP EFFICIENTLY [J].

CRAMTON, P ;

GIBBONS, R ;

KLEMPERER, P .

ECONOMETRICA, 1987, 55 (03) :615-632

[3] IMPLEMENTATION OF SOCIAL CHOICE RULES - SOME GENERAL RESULTS ON INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY [J].

DASGUPTA, P ;

HAMMOND, P ;

MASKIN, E .

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1979, 46 (02) :185-216

[4] OPTIMAL INCENTIVE CONTRACTS WITH MULTIPLE AGENTS [J].

DEMSKI, JS ;

SAPPINGTON, D .

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1984, 33 (01) :152-171

[5] RESOURCE-ALLOCATION UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION [J].

HARRIS, M ;

TOWNSEND, RM .

ECONOMETRICA, 1981, 49 (01) :33-64

[6] OUTCOME FUNCTIONS YIELDING WALRASIAN AND LINDAHL ALLOCATIONS AT NASH EQUILIBRIUM POINTS [J].

HURWICZ, L .

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1979, 46 (02) :217-225

[7]

Hurwicz L, 1984, FEASIBLE IMPLEMENTAT

[8]

KALAI E, 1986, ARE BAYESIAN NASH IN

[9]

Laffont JJ, 1982, ADV EC THEORY, P31

[10]

Maskin E., 1977, NASH EQUILIBRIUM WEL

← 1 2 3 →