A MODIFICATION OF THE FOLK THEOREM TO APPLY TO TIME-DEPENDENT SUPERGAMES

被引:5
作者
FRIEDMAN, JW
机构
来源
OXFORD ECONOMIC PAPERS-NEW SERIES | 1990年 / 42卷 / 02期
关键词
D O I
10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a041949
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
[No abstract available]
引用
收藏
页码:317 / 335
页数:19
相关论文
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