ON RENEGOTIATION DESIGN

被引：18

作者：

AGHION, P

DEWATRIPONT, M

REY, P

机构：

[1] MIT,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02139

[2] UNIV LIBRE BRUXELLES,B-1050 BRUSSELS,BELGIUM

[3] INST NATL STAT & ETUD ECON,PARIS,FRANCE

来源：

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 1990年 / 34卷 / 2-3期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0014-2921(90)90104-7

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

[No abstract available]

引用

页码：322 / 329

页数：8

共 22 条

[1]

AGHION P, 1989, UNPUB RENEGOTIATION

[2]

AGHION P, 1988, UNPUB INCOMPLETE CON

[3] THE NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION IN ECONOMIC MODELING [J].

BINMORE, K ;

RUBINSTEIN, A ;

WOLINSKY, A .

RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1986, 17 (02) :176-188

[4]

CHUNG PY, 1988, UNPUB SPECIFIC INVES

[5] THE FOLK THEOREM IN REPEATED GAMES WITH DISCOUNTING OR WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION [J].

FUDENBERG, D ;

MASKIN, E .

ECONOMETRICA, 1986, 54 (03) :533-554

[6]

GREEN J, 1988, UNPUB CONTRACT RENEG

[7] THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF OWNERSHIP - A THEORY OF VERTICAL AND LATERAL INTEGRATION [J].

GROSSMAN, SJ ;

HART, OD .

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1986, 94 (04) :691-719

[8] INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS AND RENEGOTIATION [J].

HART, O ;

MOORE, J .

ECONOMETRICA, 1988, 56 (04) :755-785

[9]

HART O, 1988, UNPUB PROPERTY RIGHT

[10]

HART O, 1989, UNPUB DEFAULT RENEGO

← 1 2 3 →