DESTRUCTIVE INTERFERENCE IN AN IMPERFECTLY COMPETITIVE MULTI-SECURITY MARKET

被引：22

作者：

BHATTACHARYA, U

RENY, RJ

SPIEGEL, M

机构：

[1] UNIV WESTERN ONTARIO,DEPT ECON,LONDON,ON N6A 5C2,CANADA

[2] UNIV CALIF BERKELEY,HAAS SCH BUSINESS,BERKELEY,CA 94720

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1995年 / 65卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1006/jeth.1995.1005

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

A general equilibrium framework is employed to illustrate how the advent of trading in new securities, about which an ''insider'' has private information, might cause a collapse of prevailing security markets. Roughly, securities that allow the insider to hedge his portfolio risk interfere with one other, and in some cases, so much so that these securities cannot simultaneously trade in any equilibrium. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.

引用

页码：136 / 170

页数：35

共 25 条

[1] A NOISY RATIONAL-EXPECTATIONS EQUILIBRIUM FOR MULTI-ASSET SECURITIES MARKETS [J].