BONDING, STRUCTURE, AND THE STABILITY OF POLITICAL-PARTIES - PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE HOUSE

The public policy benefits that parties deliver are allocated by democratic procedures that devolve ultimately to majority rule. Majority-rule decision making, however, does not lead to consistent policy choices; it is unstable. In this study, we argue that institutions-and thereby policy coalitions-can be stabilized by extra-legislative organization. The rules of the Democratic Caucus in the U.S. House of Representatives dictate that a requirement for continued membership, members must support Caucus decisions on the floor on a variety of key structural matters. Because membership in the majority party's caucus is valuable, it constitutes a bond, the posting of which stabilizes the structure of the House, and hence the policy decisions made. in the House. We examine the rules of the House Democratic Caucus and find that they do in fact contain the essential elements of an effective, extralegislative bonding mechanism.