TAXATION AND WELFARE IN AN OLIGOPOLY WITH STRATEGIC COMMITMENT

被引：20

作者：

BESLEY, T ^{[1
]}

SUZUMURA, K ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] HITOTSUBASHI UNIV,INST ECON RES,KUNITACHI,TOKYO 186,JAPAN

来源：

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW | 1992年 / 33卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2526902

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper establishes comparative statics results for an oligopoly model with strategic commitment. Firms compete in two stages. In the first stage, firms decide on strategic cost-reducing R&D investment, whereas they choose output in the second stage. Taking an excise tax/subsidy as a shift parameter in the second stage game, the short-run as well as long-run effects on output, cost-reducing R&D investment, and second-best welfare will be examined. The crucial role played by the strategic substitutability of outputs as well as cost-reducing R&D investments is clarified, and a variant of the Le Chatelier-Samuelson principle in our game-theoretic model is obtained.

引用

页码：413 / 431

页数：19

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