TAXATION AND WELFARE IN AN OLIGOPOLY WITH STRATEGIC COMMITMENT

被引:20
作者
BESLEY, T [1 ]
SUZUMURA, K [1 ]
机构
[1] HITOTSUBASHI UNIV,INST ECON RES,KUNITACHI,TOKYO 186,JAPAN
关键词
D O I
10.2307/2526902
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper establishes comparative statics results for an oligopoly model with strategic commitment. Firms compete in two stages. In the first stage, firms decide on strategic cost-reducing R&D investment, whereas they choose output in the second stage. Taking an excise tax/subsidy as a shift parameter in the second stage game, the short-run as well as long-run effects on output, cost-reducing R&D investment, and second-best welfare will be examined. The crucial role played by the strategic substitutability of outputs as well as cost-reducing R&D investments is clarified, and a variant of the Le Chatelier-Samuelson principle in our game-theoretic model is obtained.
引用
收藏
页码:413 / 431
页数:19
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