VETO THREATS - RHETORIC IN A BARGAINING GAME

被引：112

作者：

MATTHEWS, SA

机构：

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2937851

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：347 / 369

页数：23

共 21 条

[1] EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN SIGNALING GAMES [J].

BANKS, JS ;

SOBEL, J .

[2] SIGNALING GAMES AND STABLE EQUILIBRIA [J].

CHO, IK ;

KREPS, DM .

[3] STRATEGIC INFORMATION-TRANSMISSION [J].

CRAWFORD, VP ;

SOBEL, J .

[4] STANDARDIZATION, COMPATIBILITY, AND INNOVATION [J].

FARRELL, J ;

SALONER, G .

[5]

FARRELL J, 1985, MIT386 WORK PAP

[6]

FARRELL J, 1988, IN PRESS MATH MODELS

[7]

FARRELL J, 1989, IN PRESS J EC THEORY

[8]

FORGES F, 1987, FAC U SAINT LOUIS CA, V8709

[9]

FUDENBERG D, 1986, GAME THEORETIC MODEL

[10]

GREEN J, 1980, CMSEMS418 NW U DISC