ON REPEATED MORAL HAZARD WITH DISCOUNTING

被引：279

作者：

SPEAR, SE

SRIVASTAVA, S

机构：

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2297484

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：599 / 617

页数：19

共 12 条

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[2] ABREU D, 1982, REPEATED GAMES DISCO
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[J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1979, 10 (01): : 74 - 91
[4] LONG-TERM-CONTRACTS AND MORAL HAZARD
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[J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1983, 14 (02): : 441 - 452
[5] Luenberger D.G., 1997, OPTIMIZATION VECTOR
[6] REPEATED PRINCIPAL-AGENT GAMES WITH DISCOUNTING
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[J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1985, 53 (05) : 1173 - 1198
[7] MONITORING COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS IN A REPEATED PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP
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[J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1981, 49 (05) : 1127 - 1148
[8] REPEATED MORAL HAZARD
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[J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1985, 53 (01) : 69 - 76
[9] THE 1ST ORDER APPROACH TO PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEMS
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[J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1985, 53 (06) : 1357 - 1367
[10] ROGERSON WP, 1983, REPEATED MORAL HAZAR