MIDDLEMEN AS EXPERTS

被引：230

作者：

BIGLAISER, G

机构：

[1] University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

来源：

RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 1993年 / 24卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2555758

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

I show that a middleman can be welfare improving in all equilibria in a quite general bargaining model when adverse selection is present. Conditions are determined for when a middleman is most likely to be in a market. Examples of the theory are also provided.

引用

页码：212 / 223

页数：12

共 13 条

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