THE DESIGN OF RENT-SEEKING COMPETITIONS

被引：21

作者：

MICHAELS, R

机构：

来源：

PUBLIC CHOICE | 1988年 / 56卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1007/BF00052067

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：17 / 29

页数：13

共 21 条

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[2] LONG-RUN EQUILIBRIUM AND TOTAL EXPENDITURES IN RENT-SEEKING [J].

CORCORAN, WJ .

PUBLIC CHOICE, 1984, 43 (01) :89-94

[3] EFFICIENT RENTS .1. RENT-SEEKING BEHAVIOR IN THE LONG-RUN [J].

CORCORAN, WJ ;

KARELS, GV .

PUBLIC CHOICE, 1985, 46 (03) :227-246

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DEMSETZ, H .

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[5]

Ferguson C.E., 1969, NEOCLASSICAL THEORY

[6] THE SOCIAL COSTS OF MONOPOLY AND REGULATION - POSNER RECONSIDERED [J].

FISHER, FM .

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1985, 93 (02) :410-416

[7] WHY THERE ARE NO RISK PREFERRERS [J].

FRIEDMAN, D .

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1981, 89 (03) :600-600

[8] ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION AGAIN - SUBSTITUTES AND COMPLEMENTS [J].

HICKS, J .

OXFORD ECONOMIC PAPERS-NEW SERIES, 1970, 22 (03) :289-296

[9] EFFICIENT RENTS .2. FREE ENTRY AND EFFICIENT RENT SEEKING [J].

HIGGINS, RS ;

SHUGHART, WF ;

TOLLISON, RD .

PUBLIC CHOICE, 1985, 46 (03) :247-258

[10] RISK-AVERSE RENT SEEKERS AND THE SOCIAL COST OF MONOPOLY POWER [J].

HILLMAN, AL ;

KATZ, E .

ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 1984, 94 (373) :104-110

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