RELATIVE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND PROJECT SELECTION

[11] HOLSTROM B, 1986, Q J EC NOV, P835

[12] HOLSTROM B, 1982, BELL J ECON, P324

[13] JANAKIRAMAN S, 1992, J ACCOUNTING RES SPR, P53

[14] LAMBERT R, 1986, RAND J EC SPR, P77

[15] RANK-ORDER TOURNAMENTS AS OPTIMUM LABOR CONTRACTS [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1981, 89 (05) : 841 - 864

[16] PENNO M, 1984, J ACCOUNTING RES SPR, P177

[17] MONITORING COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS IN A REPEATED PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1981, 49 (05) : 1127 - 1148

[18] SAMUELSON PA, 1974, F EC ANAL

[19] SKLIVAS S, 1987, RAND J ECON, P452

[11] HOLSTROM B, 1986, Q J EC NOV, P835

[12] HOLSTROM B, 1982, BELL J ECON, P324

[13] JANAKIRAMAN S, 1992, J ACCOUNTING RES SPR, P53

[14] LAMBERT R, 1986, RAND J EC SPR, P77

[15] RANK-ORDER TOURNAMENTS AS OPTIMUM LABOR CONTRACTS [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1981, 89 (05) : 841 - 864

[16] PENNO M, 1984, J ACCOUNTING RES SPR, P177

[17] MONITORING COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS IN A REPEATED PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1981, 49 (05) : 1127 - 1148

[18] SAMUELSON PA, 1974, F EC ANAL

[19] SKLIVAS S, 1987, RAND J ECON, P452