A COMMON AGENCY WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION

被引：50

作者：

GALOR, E

机构：

来源：

RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 1991年 / 22卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2601023

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：274 / 286

页数：13

共 19 条

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