A SIMPLE NONCOOPERATIVE BARGAINING MODEL OF CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS

[11] AN OUTSIDE OPTION EXPERIMENT [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1989, 104 (04) : 753 - 770

[12] BINMORE K, 1986, RAND J ECON, V17, P185

[13] BINMORE K, 1990, ESSAYS F GAME THEORY

[14] BLUM W, 1972, U CHICAGO LAW REV, V40, P96

[15] THE "NEW DIRECTIONS" FOR PRIORITY RIGHTS IN BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATIONS [J]. HARVARD LAW REVIEW, 1954, 67 (08) : 1367 - 1379

[16] THE LAW AND LANGUAGE OF CORPORATE REORGANIZATION [J]. UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW, 1950, 17 (04) : 565 - 603

[17] FULL PRIORITY AND FULL COMPENSATION IN CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS - A REAPPRAISAL [J]. UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW, 1958, 25 (03) : 417 - 444

[18] TWO RIVAL THEORIES OF PRIORITY RIGHTS OF SECURITY HOLDERS IN A CORPORATE REORGANIZATION [J]. COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW, 1928, 28 (02) : 127 - 165

[19] CHO K, 1989, 8979 HGB AL RES F WO

[20] A THEORY OF DISAGREEMENT IN BARGAINING [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1982, 50 (03) : 607 - 637

[11] AN OUTSIDE OPTION EXPERIMENT [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1989, 104 (04) : 753 - 770

[12] BINMORE K, 1986, RAND J ECON, V17, P185

[13] BINMORE K, 1990, ESSAYS F GAME THEORY

[14] BLUM W, 1972, U CHICAGO LAW REV, V40, P96

[15] THE "NEW DIRECTIONS" FOR PRIORITY RIGHTS IN BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATIONS [J]. HARVARD LAW REVIEW, 1954, 67 (08) : 1367 - 1379

[16] THE LAW AND LANGUAGE OF CORPORATE REORGANIZATION [J]. UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW, 1950, 17 (04) : 565 - 603

[17] FULL PRIORITY AND FULL COMPENSATION IN CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS - A REAPPRAISAL [J]. UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW, 1958, 25 (03) : 417 - 444

[18] TWO RIVAL THEORIES OF PRIORITY RIGHTS OF SECURITY HOLDERS IN A CORPORATE REORGANIZATION [J]. COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW, 1928, 28 (02) : 127 - 165

[19] CHO K, 1989, 8979 HGB AL RES F WO

[20] A THEORY OF DISAGREEMENT IN BARGAINING [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1982, 50 (03) : 607 - 637