SOCIAL POWER AND CREDIBILITY OF PROMISES

Tested the Osgood model of graduated reciprocation in tension reduction proposal by placing 200 undergraduates in a strong, weak, or equal power role with respect to a simulated player. 3 non-zero-sum game matrices were employed to manipulate the degree of power resources available and the role of the S. The simulated player sent 10 unilateral, noncontingent announcements of intent to cooperate which were credible 10, 50, or 90% of the time. Ss in the powerful role ignored the initiatives and were the least cooperative. Equal power Ss were the most conciliatory and cooperative. Weak Ss were more exploitative as the credibility of the promise increased. Some complementary differences in Ss' truthfulness were found. (16 ref.) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2006 APA, all rights reserved). © 1969 American Psychological Association.