CAPABILITIES, UNCERTAINTY, AND RESOLVE - A LIMITED INFORMATION MODEL OF CRISIS BARGAINING

被引：208

作者：

MORROW, JD ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] STANFORD UNIV,STANFORD,CA 94305

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2111116

中图分类号：

D0 [政治学、政治理论];

学科分类号：

0302 ; 030201 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：941 / 972

页数：32

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