IMPLICIT CONTRACTS, INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY, AND INVOLUNTARY UNEMPLOYMENT

被引:331
作者
MACLEOD, WB [1 ]
MALCOMSON, JM [1 ]
机构
[1] UNIV SOUTHAMPTON,DEPT ECON,SOUTHAMPTON SO9 5NH,HANTS,ENGLAND
关键词
D O I
10.2307/1912562
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:447 / 480
页数:34
相关论文
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