HOW SENSITIVE IS EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION TO ORGANIZATIONAL SIZE

被引:58
作者
LAMBERT, RA
LARCKER, DF
WEIGELT, K
机构
[1] Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
关键词
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION; AGENCY THEORY; INCENTIVE PROBLEMS; ORGANIZATIONAL SIZE; SALARY STRUCTURE;
D O I
10.1002/smj.4250120506
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Prior empirical research has documented a large cross‐sectional correlation between the level of executive pay and firm size. In contrast, this paper examines the association between percentage changes in executive compensation and percentage changes in organizational size. We analyze compensation and size data for executives at several levels of the corporate hierarchy for a sample of 303 firms. Our results indicate that the correlation between compensation and size is much smaller, although still statistically significant, in changes than in levels. This suggests that changes in an executive's compensation are not primarily driven by changes in organizational size. Copyright © 1991 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
引用
收藏
页码:395 / 402
页数:8
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