COOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIA IN DISCOUNTED STOCHASTIC SEQUENTIAL GAMES

被引：4

作者：

HAURIE, A ^{[1
]}

TOLWINSKI, B ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] COLORADO SCH MINES,DEPT MATH,GOLDEN,CO 80401

来源：

JOURNAL OF OPTIMIZATION THEORY AND APPLICATIONS | 1990年 / 64卷 / 03期

关键词：

cooperative equilibria; dynamic games; dynamic programming; games with unobservable actions; Stochastic games;

D O I：

10.1007/BF00939422

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];

学科分类号：

070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

This paper addresses the problem of computation of cooperative equilibria in discounted stochastic sequential games. The proposed approach contains as a special case the method of Green and Porter (developed originally for repeated oligopoly games), but it is more general than the latter in the sense that it generates nontrivial equilibrium solutions for a much larger class of dynamic games. This fact is demonstrated on two examples, one concerned with duopolistic economics and the other with fishery management. © 1990 Plenum Publishing Corporation.

引用

页码：511 / 535

页数：25

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