MONITORING AND REPUTATION - THE CHOICE BETWEEN BANK LOANS AND DIRECTLY PLACED DEBT

[1] EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN SIGNALING GAMES [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1987, 55 (03) : 647 - 661

[2] STRATEGIC STABILITY AND UNIQUENESS IN SIGNALING GAMES [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1990, 50 (02) : 381 - 413

[3] FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION AND DELEGATED MONITORING [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1984, 51 (03) : 393 - 414

[4] REPUTATION ACQUISITION IN DEBT MARKETS [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1989, 97 (04) : 828 - 862

[5] DIAMOND DW, 1991, QJE, V106

[6] KOLBERG E, 1986, ECONOMETRICA, V54, P1003

[7] REPUTATION AND IMPERFECT INFORMATION [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1982, 27 (02) : 253 - 279

[8] PREDATION, REPUTATION, AND ENTRY DETERRENCE [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1982, 27 (02) : 280 - 312

[9] TOWNSEND RM, 1979, J ECON THEORY, V21, P265, DOI 10.1016/0022-0531(79)90031-0

[1] EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN SIGNALING GAMES [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1987, 55 (03) : 647 - 661

[2] STRATEGIC STABILITY AND UNIQUENESS IN SIGNALING GAMES [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1990, 50 (02) : 381 - 413

[3] FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION AND DELEGATED MONITORING [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1984, 51 (03) : 393 - 414

[4] REPUTATION ACQUISITION IN DEBT MARKETS [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1989, 97 (04) : 828 - 862

[5] DIAMOND DW, 1991, QJE, V106

[6] KOLBERG E, 1986, ECONOMETRICA, V54, P1003

[7] REPUTATION AND IMPERFECT INFORMATION [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1982, 27 (02) : 253 - 279

[8] PREDATION, REPUTATION, AND ENTRY DETERRENCE [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1982, 27 (02) : 280 - 312

[9] TOWNSEND RM, 1979, J ECON THEORY, V21, P265, DOI 10.1016/0022-0531(79)90031-0