EVOLUTION AND COOPERATION IN NOISY REPEATED GAMES

被引:10
作者
FUDENBERG, D [1 ]
MASKIN, E [1 ]
机构
[1] HARVARD UNIV, CAMBRIDGE, MA 02138 USA
关键词
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
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页码:274 / 279
页数:6
相关论文
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[3]  
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