BANK CEO PAY-PERFORMANCE RELATIONS AND THE EFFECTS OF DEREGULATION

被引：86

作者：

CRAWFORD, AJ ^{[1
]}

EZZELL, JR ^{[1
]}

MILES, JA ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] PENN STATE UNIV,UNIVERSITY PK,PA 16802

来源：

JOURNAL OF BUSINESS | 1995年 / 68卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1086/296662

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We test the deregulation hypothesis that posits that bank CEO compensation became more sensitive to performance as bank management became less regulated. We observe a significant increase in pay-performance sensitivities from our 1976-81 regulation subsample to our 1982-88 deregulation subsample. These increases in pay sensitivies after deregulation are observed for salary and bonus, stock options, and common stock holdings. We observe increases in the pay-performance relation associated with high-capitialization-ratio banks, consistent with providing incentives for wealth creation while even larger increases in pay-performance sensitivity for lower-capitalization-ratio banks suggest an Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation moral hazard problem.

引用

页码：231 / 256

页数：26

共 21 条

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