THE STRENGTH OF A LITTLE PERFECTION

被引：11

作者：

KALAI, E ^{[1
]}

NEME, A ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV NACL SAN LUIS,IMASL,RA-5700 SAN LUIS,ARGENTINA

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY | 1992年 / 20卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1007/BF01271130

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The paper deals with three related issues. 1. It introduces a measure of partial subgame perfection for equilibria of repeated games. 2. It illustrates that the folk-theorem discontinuity generated by small complexity costs, as exhibited by Abreu and Rubinstein, does not exist in the presence of any level of perfection. 3. It shows that reactive strategy equilibria, such as tit-for-tat, cannot be subgame perfect, even partially so. As a corollary, this shows a need to use full automata rather than exact automata when studying complexity and perfection in repeated games.

引用

页码：335 / 355

页数：21

共 26 条

[1] THE STRUCTURE OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN REPEATED GAMES WITH FINITE AUTOMATA
ABREU, D
RUBINSTEIN, A
[J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1988, 56 (06) : 1259 - 1281
[2] ON THE THEORY OF INFINITELY REPEATED GAMES WITH DISCOUNTING
ABREU, D
[J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1988, 56 (02) : 383 - 396
[3] [Anonymous], 1981, ESSAYS GAME THEORY M
[4] Aumann R., 1976, LONG TERM COMPETITIO
[5] AUMANN RJ, 1988, INT C EC THEORIES PO
[6] BENPORATH E, 1987, UNPUB FOLK THEOREM F
[7] BENPORATH E, 1986, UNPUB REPEATED GAMES
[8] MODELING RATIONAL PLAYERS .1.
BINMORE, K
[J]. ECONOMICS AND PHILOSOPHY, 1987, 3 (02) : 179 - 214
[9] THE FOLK THEOREM IN REPEATED GAMES WITH DISCOUNTING OR WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
FUDENBERG, D
MASKIN, E
[J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1986, 54 (03) : 533 - 554
[10] FUDENBERG D, 1987, 1301 HARV U DISC PAP

← 1 2 3 →