EXISTENCE OF ELECTORAL EQUILIBRIA WITH PROBABILISTIC VOTING

被引：6

作者：

FELDMAN, AM ^{[1
]}

LEE, KH ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] AJOU UNIV, SUWON 170, SOUTH KOREA

来源：

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS | 1988年 / 35卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0047-2727(88)90054-0

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：205 / 227

页数：23

共 23 条

[1]

Arrow K.J., 1963, SOCIAL CHOICE INDIVI, V2nd

[2]

Black Duncan, 1958, THEORY COMMITTEES EL

[3]

Comanor, 1976, J PUBLIC ECON, V5, P169

[4] ELECTORAL OUTCOMES WITH PROBABILISTIC VOTING AND NASH SOCIAL-WELFARE MAXIMA [J].

COUGHLIN, P ;

NITZAN, S .

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1981, 15 (01) :113-121

[5] PARETO OPTIMALITY OF POLICY PROPOSALS WITH PROBABILISTIC VOTING [J].

COUGHLIN, P .

PUBLIC CHOICE, 1982, 39 (03) :427-433

[6] DIRECTIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTORAL EQUILIBRIA WITH PROBABILISTIC VOTING [J].

COUGHLIN, P ;

NITZAN, S .

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1981, 24 (02) :226-239

[7] ELECTIONS AND INCOME-REDISTRIBUTION [J].

COUGHLIN, PJ .

PUBLIC CHOICE, 1986, 50 (1-3) :27-91

[8] SOCIAL PREFERENCE ORDERINGS AND MAJORITY RULE [J].

DAVIS, OA ;

HINICH, MJ ;

DEGROOT, MH .

ECONOMETRICA, 1972, 40 (01) :147-&

[9]

Davis OttoA., 1968, PUBLIC CHOICE, V5, P59, DOI DOI 10.1007/BF01718684

[10]

Downs A., 1957, EC THEORY DEMOCRACY

← 1 2 3 →