ORDINAL BAYESIAN INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE REPRESENTATIONS OF COMMITTEES

被引:28
作者
DASPREMONT, C [1 ]
PELEG, B [1 ]
机构
[1] HEBREW UNIV JERUSALEM,DEPT MATH,IL-91904 JERUSALEM,ISRAEL
关键词
D O I
10.1007/BF00433655
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:261 / 279
页数:19
相关论文
共 15 条
[1]   MAJORITY AND POSITIONAL VOTING IN A PROBABILISTIC FRAMEWORK [J].
BARBERA, S .
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1979, 46 (02) :379-389
[2]   IMPLEMENTATION OF SOCIAL CHOICE RULES - SOME GENERAL RESULTS ON INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY [J].
DASGUPTA, P ;
HAMMOND, P ;
MASKIN, E .
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1979, 46 (02) :185-216
[3]   INCENTIVES AND INCOMPLETE INFORMATION [J].
DASPREMONT, C ;
GERARDVARET, LA .
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1979, 11 (01) :25-45
[4]   BAYESIAN INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE BELIEFS [J].
DASPREMONT, C ;
GERARDVARET, LA .
JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, 1982, 10 (01) :83-103
[5]   EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS OF CHOICES INVOLVING RISK [J].
HANOCH, G ;
LEVY, H .
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1969, 36 (03) :335-346
[6]   GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION PLAYED BY BAYESIAN PLAYERS .2. BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIUM POINTS [J].
HARSANYI, JC .
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 1968, 14 (05) :320-334
[7]  
Harsanyi J., 1967, MANAGE SCI, V14, P159, DOI [10.1287/mnsc.14.3.159, DOI 10.1287/MNSC.14.3.159]
[8]  
HARSANYI JC, 1967, MANAGE SCI, V14, P158
[9]   ON STRONG REPRESENTATIONS OF GAMES BY SOCIAL CHOICE FUNCTIONS [J].
HOLZMAN, R .
JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, 1986, 15 (01) :39-57
[10]  
Hylland A, 1980, STRATEGY PROOFNESS V