ESCALATION ERRORS AND THE SUNK COST EFFECT - AN EXPLANATION BASED ON REPUTATION AND INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES

被引:123
作者
KANODIA, C [1 ]
BUSHMAN, R [1 ]
DICKHAUT, J [1 ]
机构
[1] UNIV CHICAGO,CHICAGO,IL 60637
关键词
D O I
10.2307/2491207
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:59 / 77
页数:19
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